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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of theoretically well- founded empirical 
examinations on how economic freedom affects economic performance, which is not the case, 
as we argue, in most of the huge empirical literature developed after the construction of 
various indexes of economic freedom. In this spirit we develop a concept of economic 
freedom based on Hayek (1960): absence of coercion except for state coercion to enforce 
known general rules. Trying to formulate Hayek’s ideas on a less abstract level, as a step 
further we propose a categorization of government actions, which gives us some guidance 
about which government actions hurt and which do not hurt economic freedom. Our concept 
of economic freedom allows us to conceptualize the measurement of economic freedom in a 
different way from the indexes of economic freedom. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the past decade the concept of economic freedom, after being for a relatively long 
period a subject of little interest among economists, has attracted more attention. This is due 
to the emergence of indexes ranking countries according to a scale running from the least free 
to the freest. Now there exist two widely accepted indexes of economic freedom: the one 
developed by the Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom of the World Index), and another 
constructed by the Heritage Foundation jointly with the Wall Street Journal (Index of 
Economic Freedom). These two indexes are quite similar in terms of what they consider as a 
plus and as a minus when measuring economic freedom. 
The Fraser index includes five main areas, namely the extent of government intervention, 
the secur ity of property rights and the Rule of Law, the stability of the monetary system, the 
burdens of international trade, and the extent of regulation on different markets. By breaking 
down each area into several components and subcomponents, it aggregates 38 separate 
categories of data (Gwartney and Lawson 2006:10). The Heritage’s index has ten components 
that can also be grouped into the above-mentioned five areas (De Haan and Sturm 2000). 
However, here the data generating process and the index itself are less transparent, and in 
addition this index evaluates countries over a shorter time scale (from 1995 as opposed to 
1970 in the Fraser’s case). 
Since the construction of these indexes researchers have been using them quite 
extensively in examining the effects economic freedom has on economic performance and on 
various measures of human welfare. So far a significant number of econometric papers have 
been accumulated. However, this body of the literature – by focusing on empirical 
examinations – completely neglects the discussion of what is precisely understood by 
economic freedom, the index of which they use so extensively. Furthermore, what is more 
surprising is the fact that the researchers who came up with the construction of the indexes 
themselves do not provide theoretical foundations for these indexes (Gwartney et al 1996, 
Gwartney and Lawson 2003). 
While we agree that empirical investigations are important, we argue that these should be 
based on a coherent theory, that is, our position is ‘theory first, and empiricism after’. 
Contrary to what is often asserted in this empirical literature, we argue that it is not the 
imperfect econometric and statistical methods that lie at the heart of the major problems 
regarding the effects of freedom on growth, but the lack of a coherent theory concerning 
economic freedom itself. In this spirit we will review and criticize this empirical literature 
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from a theoretical point of view (Section 2) and then in Section 3 we will provide a clear 
concept of economic freedom based on Hayek (1960), the Rule of Law being a core element 
of this concept. In Section 4 we will develop a classification of government actions, which is  
necessary for our conceptualization of economic freedom. Based on this, we evaluate the 
indexes of economic freedom used in the empirical literature, and then propose a concept for 
an alternative means of measuring it (Section 5). Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Review and critique of the literature  
 
We organize our review and critique around what this empirical literature says about three 
questions: (1) what is the relationship between economic freedom and growth? (2) what is the 
mechanism of this effect? (3) which component of economic freedom is the most important? 
 
2.1. Relationship: level versus change 
 
The major question of the studies is, of course, whether economic freedom or a change in the 
degree of economic freedom has an effect on economic growth or on income, and if so, how 
much. Here the main result is found in the positive correlation between economic freedom 
and growth. This positive correlation is shown while other “traditional” sources of growth are 
held constant. For instance, Easton and Walker (1997) consider economic freedom a 
determinant of the total factor productivity in the production function, and find a positive 
relationship between economic freedom and income. Gwartney and Lawson (2004) obtain a 
similar result when holding initial income, the growth rate of human capital, tropical location 
and coastal population constant. 
When it comes to the “how much” question the answer is ambiguous, because different 
researchers use various  model specifications. However, Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 
(2006:66-67) show that when counting the partial correlation from a number of studies, one 
finds that these estimates in terms of partial correlation occur over very limited intervals. But 
those researchers who, for various reasons (see below), prefer to use the change in the index 
estimate this effect differently and usually find that the change has a statistically stronger 
effect on growth (De Haan and Sturm 2000:231, Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe 1999). 
The examinations of the effect of the change in the economic freedom index generally lead to 
the conclusion that earlier change has a greater effect on the growth rate (Gwartney, Lawson 
and Holcombe 1999, Gwartney and Lawson 2004), which might be attributed to the fact that 
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it takes time for the change in the institutional structure to have a full effect on economic 
performance. 
Another very important result of this literature is that the positive relationship between 
economic freedom and growth is not substantially different for developing countries 
compared to developed ones. As Gwartney and Lawson (2004) point out, the positive impact 
of economic freedom on growth is greater in the case of less developed countries, and when it 
comes to the effect on the productivity of investments there is no difference between the two 
groups of countries. De Haan and Sturm (2000) draw a similar conclusion from their cross 
country regression complemented with extreme bound analysis. 
It is not only income as a relatively narrow measure of welfare that seems to be in positive 
relationship with economic freedom, but the broader measures of welfare as well, such as life 
expectancy or literacy (Esposto and Zaleski 1999). 
Besides the consensual substantive results, there are some methodological questions upon 
which researchers disagree. One controversial issue in the literature about the role of 
economic freedom on growth is whether the level or the change in the level of economic 
freedom should be included when examining the effect of economic freedom on economic 
growth. Those authors who apply sensitivity analysis (e. g., de Haan et al. 2000, De Haan and 
Siermann 1998) are more sceptical about the effect of the level of economic freedom itself 
and tend, rather, to highlight the importance of the change in economic freedom, as is also 
shown in the review article of De Haan et al. (2006) and Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 
(2006). 
Clearly, the arguments in this “level versus change” debate do not only concern the size of 
the effect, but also causation; that is, theory, as revealed in the debate between De Haan et al. 
(2006), De Haan and Sturm (2006), Lawson (2006) and Cole and Lawson (2007). The 
significance of the level together with the change of the index may be the sign of reverse 
causality, while without using the concept of level one cannot explain the performance of 
economies with high growth and high economic freedom (De Haan et al. 2006, Lawson 2006, 
De Haan and Sturm 2006). 
We think this debate supports our proposition about the lack of a coherent theory of 
freedom. It is clear from the above that the literature, again and again, only proves the 
positive sign of this relationship, but never tries to explain it theoretically. Thus, a reliance on 
a theory would lead the researchers to derive different specifications concerning the effects of 
economic freedom, and in this case the debate would not be about whether an effect exists or 
not, but about how to explain it. Clearly, the “level versus change” debate is about choosing 
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the proper specification, and it is difficult to imagine how one can do this without any 
theoretical background. Thus, the lack of a well-articulated theory of freedom is, we think, an 
obstacle to a further development of this (empirical) literature. 
 
2.2. Mechanisms: causality 
 
The literature in question also examines the channels through which economic freedom 
affects growth. An important question within this broader area is whether economic freedom 
deploys its effect directly or indirectly, that is, through some other factors of growth. In this 
respect the literature asks whether economic freedom improves technology or investment or 
both. One answer comes from Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (2004), who, after 
comparing three possible models, conclude that economic freedom has direct as well as 
indirect effects on growth: in those countries where economic freedom is greater (or where it 
has changed to a greater extent), investment rates are higher, and so is the productivity of 
investments. Dawson (1998) also supports the view that economic freedom has both direct 
and indirect effects, Gwartney, Holcombe and Lawson (2006) confirm this conclusion. 
The direct effect, i.e., the effect on technology, was demonstrated by Easton and Walker 
(1997), as we have seen in the previous section. Note however that there are, of course, 
counterarguments denying the relationship between investment and economic freedom (De 
Haan and Sturm 2000, De Haan and Siermann 1998). Thus, the direct effect from freedom to 
growth seems to have sounder empirical underpinnings. 
Although the way different components of economic freedom affect growth will be 
discussed in the next section, the role of property rights should be dealt with here, because the 
mechanism through which this component affects growth is the best explained in this 
literature. Barro (2000) for example refers to two main mechanisms when trying to explain 
the effect of property rights, namely the effect on incentives and that on business activity. His 
empirical findings (Barro 2000:40-41) show that secure property rights improve growth 
performance not only by encouraging investments, but by enhancing the productivity of 
investments. The first channel is analyzed deeper by Torstensson (1994), who highlights the 
role property rights play in human and physical capital accumulation. 
The conclusion is thus that economic freedom and property rights have direct as well as 
indirect effects on growth. The direct effect refers to those channels through which resources 
are used in a more efficient way, that is, the allocation takes place on the basis of a better 
technology and “better prices”. The indirect effect involves the fact that the freer the 
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economy, the more incentives people have to allocate their resources into (socially) 
productive activities. 
The problem of causality arises, of course, more fiercely here than in the studies reviewed 
in the previous section. By using the methodology of Granger-causality numerous scholars try 
to show the direction of causality between economic freedom and growth. What is debated is 
not only the direction of the causality in general, but whether there is a reverse causality 
besides the causal relationship running from economic freedom to growth. Some argue that 
economic freedom is purely exogenous as Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe (1999) and De 
Haan and Sturm (2000) do, while others, like Dawson (2003), and Farr, Lord and 
Wolfenberger (1998) find that there is a mutual relationship between growth or income and 
economic freedom. 
Alternatively to investment and technology channels, there are other possible 
mechanisms. One is the effect through inequality. In his analysis Grubel (1998) sees the 
change in inequality induced by economic freedom as a channel through which economic 
freedom affects growth. Scully (2002) analyzes this question in a more sophisticated way, as 
he argues that economic freedom reduces inequality, given economic growth, but more 
freedom leads to higher growth, and higher growth leads to more inequality. 
Another alternative mechanism for economic freedom to affect growth is the one working 
through social capital identified as generalized trust in society (Berggren and Jordahl 2006). 
The main result of the latter article is that economic freedom, as well as three of its 
components, have a positive relationship with trust. The authors are even able to show that the 
property rights component is exogenous, while economic freedom as such is not, or at least 
only weakly so. This latter conclusion,  as we will argue in the second part of the paper, might 
be attributed to the fact that several countries with a high quality legal structure have big 
governments which reduce economic freedom as usually measured. 
An important point to note is that when trying to identify the mechanisms through which 
economic freedom deploys its effects, the studies are either purely empirical and do not 
provide any theoretical ground for their examinations except for common sense reasoning, or 
they use theories which do not refer to economic freedom. In addition, the purely empirically 
identified mechanisms are not explanations, because they are not framed in terms of human 
action. For instance, as far as the direct effect of freedom is concerned, what one can know 
based on this literature is  that freedom makes investment more productive, but  not the why, 
and this unanswered question is the result of the absence of a theory of economic freedom. 
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2.3. Components versus aggregation 
 
The theoretical weakness we have referred to several times may be best observed in those 
articles that pay attention to the effects of the overall index and its components separately. It 
seems to be obvious that in order to examine how different components of economic freedom 
affect growth, one first should have a theory of what makes economic freedom, and second, a 
theory of how these elements of freedom may effect growth. As we will see below, the main 
body of this literature is missing at least one of these two. 
One problematic issue concerns whether it is useful to aggregate the components of the 
index of economic freedom (De Haan et al. 2006, Lawson 2006). Another concerns the 
components themselves; provided that we do not aggregate them, which component(s) should 
be taken into account, that is, which “part” of economic freedom enhances growth? 
When it comes to the first question, one argument is that there is no sense in separating 
the components or examining them separately because this is “like asking what the most 
important ingredient is in a cherry pie” (Lawson 2006:401). The counterargument (De Haan 
and Sturm 2006:408) is that “there is not a unique recipe for a cherry pie”, that is, we do not 
measure economic freedom as such, only its proxies: economic freedom is a latent variable, 
and what we want is the best estimate of this variable, and in order to find the best proxy we 
must use various measures and components. In fact, what lies at the root of this debate is the 
question of what economic freedom is and whether economic freedom is an independent 
concept or only the sum of particular components. Our argument is that without having a 
theory of economic freedom we do not know what we want to measure, and, accordingly, we 
cannot resolve the above dilemma. 
Another problem concerns the issue of why we need to construct an index at all, taking 
into account the fact that the literature (Barro 1997, Easterly 2005) has also examined the 
variables which make up the components of the index (inflation, government consumption)? 
And if we want to examine the components of economic freedom, why start from the 
aggregate? However, even if it is accepted that the components must be aggregated, the 
question still remains, how to do so. That the method of aggregation is not evident is revealed 
in the debate between Heckelman and Stroup (2000, 2002) and Sturm, Leertouwer and Haan 
(2002). This debate on whether the procedure of aggregation should be based on the results of 
the regression shows the lack of a theory on how the components of economic freedom affect 
growth, as mentioned above. 
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The fact that the result of the regression is sensitive to the method of aggregation (e.g., De 
Haan and Siermann 1998) is not a sufficient argument to make us reinterpret what we think 
economic freedom is, because the theory of freedom and the theory explaining how freedom 
affects growth are different things. Nevertheless, the authors realize that “a serious problem in 
this regard is that economic theory does not provide enough guidance for the proper 
specification of empirical growth models” (Sturm, Leertower and Haan 2002:410), which is 
an aspect of our argument about the lack of a coherent theory on economic freedom. 
When it comes to the second question, which concerns the importance of each particular 
component, the method of providing an answer is twofold. One method is to run multivariate 
regressions with all the components and pick out those that survive the usual statistical tests. 
Another method is to pick out only one component, either on a theoretical basis, just as in the 
case of property rights discussed in the previous section, or as a proxy for overall economic 
freedom. 
Dawson (2003) as well as Carlsson and Lundström (2002) apply the first method. What 
makes their results interesting is that they draw some conclusions that are unusual within this 
literature. Dawson shows that some components (e.g., size of government) may be the result 
of growth, rather than its cause, while Cralsson and Lundström point out that some 
components (freedom to trade with foreigners, size of government) may have even negative 
effects on growth. 
An alternative answer to the “which component” question is to pick out and use, on a 
theoretical basis or as a proxy, only one component. This is the method of those authors who 
examine the effect of the Rule of Law and property rights on growth, as discussed above. In 
addition to those mentioned above, Heitger (2004), like many others, shows that property 
rights have an effect through and beyond human and physical capital accumulation. In 
addition, he also demonstrates the presence of endogeniety in this relationship: the causation 
does not only run from property rights to income, but from income to property rights, too. 
There is no doubt that this literature provides us with a great deal of information on 
whether and to what extent different components of economic freedom move together with 
economic growth. But, our theoretical perspective makes us pose one important and – by this 
literature – still unanswered question: what theories of economic freedom do we falsify or 
verify by showing that this or that index or component of economic freedom improves or 
harms economic growth? As we have argued above, this question remains unanswered 
because this literature does not try to build on any theory of economic freedom. In the next 
section we will try to propose a clear-cut concept of economic freedom. 
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3. Towards which concept of economic freedom? 
 
We have reviewed above the empirical literature on economic freedom, organized around 
three disputed questions: (1) “level versus change in level”, (2) the mechanics through which 
economic freedoms affect growth or income (cause versus effect), (3) “components versus 
aggregate”. At a first glance, these problems seem to be methodological or econometric 
problems, but in fact they are not: this body of literature is missing a coherent theory of 
economic freedom, and this is precisely what lies at the heart of the problems of various 
empirical studies analyzing the effects of economic freedom. We clearly argue that the 
debated questions cannot be solved through empirical examinations; we need a clear-cut 
concept of economic freedom, that is why our position is ‘theory first, and empiricism after’. 
In this spirit, in the following part of our paper we propose the major building blocks of the 
theory of economic freedom. 
The lack of a coherent theory of economic freedom is somewhat surprising since the 
concept of freedom was clearly developed by Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty. In what 
follows we will present the Hayekian concept of freedom, whose usefulness consists in the 
generality of the concept which, accordingly, can be applied to conceptualize various kinds of 
freedoms, such as economic, political or civil freedom.1 Focusing of course on economic 
freedom and relying on Hayek (1960) we will show that a core element of economic freedom 
is the Rule of Law. 2 
In order to avoid those or similar problems that characterize the empirical literature on 
economic freedom we have to make a clarification before trying to conceptua lize economic 
freedom. Since the state is inevitable (Holcombe 2004, Benson 1999)3, our argument is that 
economic freedom should be interpreted under the existence of a state (government). To put it 
differently, in accordance with Hayek (1960), economic freedom should be understood as 
freedom under governmental law, and not the absence of all governmental actions. Thus, 
economic freedom does not mean freedom in an absolute sense; some governmental actions 
must be supposed to exist. The reason for this lies in how the state has emerged in an 
undesigned, evolutionary process (Barzel 2000, 2002, Benson 1998, 1999, Hayek 1973, 
Holcombe 2004, Olson 1993): all modern states evolved from extortionist institutions to 
                                                 
1 We agree with Friedman (1962) in seeing economic and political freedom as components of freedom broadly 
understood, so both being ends in themselves. 
2 We argue that additional elements such as freedom of contract, property rights, sound money and political 
decentralization which were emphasized by Harper (2003) as constituting parts of economic freedom come from 
and depend on it. Because of a shortage of space we cannot develop this idea here. 
3 For a critique see Leeson and Stringham (2005). 
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secure property rights. And in this evolutionary process the state acquired a monopoly over 
coercion. 
Consequently, coercion4 is a crucial concept for making sense of freedom. Based on this 
consideration, as Hayek argues, “[f]reedom demands no more than that (the coercion of other 
individuals’ – authors’ addition) coercion and violence, fraud and deception, be prevented, 
except for the use of coercion by the government for the sole purpose of enforcing known 
rules intended to secure the best conditions under which the individual may give his activities 
a coherent, rational pattern” (Hayek 1960:144). Nevertheless, as Hayek (1960) points out, a 
paradox is that the only means whereby the state can prevent the coercion of one individual 
by another is the very threat of coercion, i.e., the only way to prevent one act of coercion is by 
the threat of another. However bear in mind that the state, by having a monopoly over 
coercion, remains the primary threat to freedom. Accordingly, as we will discuss at a greater 
length below, the major question is in which field(s) government monopoly over coercion is 
allowed and what kinds of governmental actions are not harmful to economic freedom. 
Although here Hayek (1960, 1973) does not differentiate between various types of 
freedom, such as political or economic freedom, his concept still provides a coherent basis for 
making sense of economic freedom. We argue that the adjective “economic” or “political” 
determines the fields in which we should narrow or specify the meaning of freedom 
understood broadly as absence of coercion except for state coercion to enforce known rules. 
In this spirit, when it comes to economic freedom, state monopoly over coercion should be 
understood as concerning the economic activities of individuals ; more precisely their 
entrepreneurial acts. Economic freedom permits individuals to exploit their productive 
potential by following their own plans and the opportunities to amass wealth safeguarded 
against confiscation (Barzel 2000). That is, in an economically free society individuals are 
allowed to realize their plans on the market. If state coercion goes beyond the limits defined 
above, economic freedom is hurt. Accordingly, state coercion must be limited: normative 
restrictions should be imposed on the coercive power of the government and on the manner in 
which it exercises its power (Hayek 1960).5 
                                                 
4 “Coercion occurs when one man’s actions are made to serve another man’s will, not for his own but for other’s 
purpose” (Hayek 1960:133). The coercer can determine the alternatives for the coerced so that the latter will 
choose what the coercer wants: “in order to avoid greater evil, he (the coerced – authors’ addition) is forced to 
act not according to a coherent plan of his own, but to serve the ends of another (the coercer – authors’ 
addition)” (Hayek 1960:21). 
Of course, there are several forms of coercion, the threat of violence or physical force is the most important form 
of this, and even in this form there are many degrees of coercion. 
5 Here it is worth noting that the concept of “limited government” should not refer to the size of the government 
per se, but rather, to in what fields the state exercises its coercive power. This idea will be developed in a more 
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The principle that provides us with a criterion according to which we can evaluate 
freedom is the Rule of Law. 6 This ideal of freedom is best described in Hayek (1960) and in 
Leoni (1961), and refers to a situation where governmental coercive actions conform to 
general abstract rules laid down beforehand. In fact, the Rule of Law is a doctrine of what the 
law should be: “The rule of law is therefore not a rule of the law, but a rule concerning what 
the law ought to be, a meta- legal doctrine or a political ideal” (Hayek 1960:206). Clearly, the 
Rule of Law restricts government in its coercive activities.7  
The Rule of Law includes three principles: (1) the certainty, (2) the generality and (3) the 
equality of the law. The certainty of law is probably the most important requirement for 
economic activities; according to Leoni (1972:95) it refers to the fact that individuals can 
make long-term plans, which necessitates that the law is not subjected to sudden and 
unpredictable changes.8 The generality of law means that the law never concerns particular 
individuals, i.e., law is abstract from the specific circumstances of time and place.9 In other 
words, to be abstract the law must consist of purpose- independent rules governing the conduct 
of individuals towards each other, and apply to an unknown number of further instances by 
enabling an order of actions (Hayek 1973). Equality of the law means that all legal rules apply 
to everybody including to those in power. That is, every individual, whatever his rank, is 
subject to the ordinary law of the realm. More importantly, laws apply both to those who lay 
them down and those who apply them. As a result, the state is limited in the same manner as 
any private person. 
In addition to these three principles, as Leoni (1971) proposes we should add another one, 
although Hayek (1960) itself does not qualify it as a principle. This is (4) the fact that 
administrative discretion in coercive power must always be subject to review by independent 
courts. What is required under the Rule of Law is that a court should have the power to decide 
not only whether a particular action of the government agency was intra vires or ultra vires 
but whether the substance of the administrative decision was as the law demanded (Hayek 
                                                                                                                                                        
detail later. Here we would just like to emphasize that, as opposed to what is suggested in a large part of the 
literature, the size of the government per se does not reduce economic freedom. 
6 “Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those in a country under arbitrary 
government than the observance in the former of the great principles known as the Rule of Law” (Hayek 
1944:54). 
7 Note, however, that the Rule of Law is concerned only with the coercive activities of the government. It limits 
the functions of governments to those that can be carried out by means of general rules, but it does not tell 
anything as regards the non-coercive activities of the government. 
8 As Leoni (1971) argues, as opposed to this Anglo-Saxon concept of the certainty of law the Continental idea of 
the certainty of the law was equivalent to the idea of a precisely worded, written formula. Note however that this 
does not guarantee that individuals would be free from interference by authorities. 
9 British common law is this type of an abstract law, evolved in a spontaneous process. For an overview of its 
emergence and evolution see, among others, Benson (1998). 
 11 
1960:214). To ensure this there must be some authority which is concerned with the rules, and 
not with any temporary aims of the government and which has the right to say whether 
another authority had the right to act as it did, and whether what it did was required by the 
law. 
We consider the Rule of Law a core element in economic freedom since it is this principle 
that gives us guidance to determine what kinds of actions the government can take in an 
economically free country. 10 Below, following the Hayekian line but going a step further, we 
will develop a categorization of government actions on which our conceptualization of 
economic freedom is based. 
 
4. Economic freedom and government actions: towards a clarification 
 
A conclusion from the above is that economic freedom relates to the character of government 
actions, rather than the volume of government actions. In this respect, we think it is useful to 
distinguish, on the one hand, between coercive and non-coercive actions, as we have 
implicitly done above, and on the other hand, between two kinds of coercive activities of a 
state, those that are compatible with economic freedom (freedom-compatible coercive 
activities) and those that are not (freedom non-compatible coercive activities). In what 
follows we characterize government actions at a greater length in this categorization schema. 
 
4.1. Non-coercive activities 
 
Non-coercive government activities, referred to as services by Hayek (1960, 1973), by 
definition, do not concern economic freedom, while they influence the size of the 
government. For a coherent framework we propose to differentiate between two kinds of 
governmental services. On the one hand, there are those services that the government should 
exclusively provide; that is, it should have a monopoly (services with agreed monopoly). On 
the other hand, there are those in which in principle the government should not have a 
monopoly (services provided on competitive grounds). 
The former set of services includes those government actions that are imperative for a 
favorable institutional framework for individuals’ free acts. Since the institutions in question 
                                                 
10 The Rule of Law consists of “rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to foresee 
with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive power in given circumstances, and to plan one’s 
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge” (Hayek 1944:54). 
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would not emerge spontaneously, i.e., they need governmental design, the government should 
have a monopoly over them. We call these services services with agreed monopoly. Clearly, 
these services (e.g., national defence, various official governmental statistics and information) 
provide the means for a better execution of individuals’ plans.11  
As far as the second group of services is concerned, here the government should work on 
the same terms as individuals. These services include most importantly health care, schooling, 
etc. Of course, it cannot be expected that there will ever be unanimity on the desirability of 
these services being provided by the government, and there exist counterarguments other than 
that of economic freedom (e.g., efficiency). The important thing, however, is that one should 
not confuse the issue of economic freedom with that of efficiency. For instance, if people for 
whatever reasons prefer public to private schools, and public to private health care and the 
governments satisfies these wants, this should not be seen as reducing economic freedom per 
se. If so, even the fact that there is an efficiency loss under government provision has nothing 
to do with economic freedom per se. Of course, we do think that efficiency loss has to be seen 
as an argument against the government, but this is an argument on its own right, which is 
different from arguing against the government on the grounds of economic freedom. That is 
why we argue that the size of the government per se does not hurt economic freedom. 
Nevertheless, this question should not be confused with the question of what method the 
government adopts to provide these services. Not all methods are acceptable when it comes to 
economic freedom. For instance monopoly, prohibition or specific orders are not. In a free 
society the government can have the monopoly only over coercion, and nothing else, and in 
other respects it has to operate on the same terms as everybody else (Hayek 1960:222-223). 
Based on the above, one should be very careful when analyzing the relationship between 
economic freedom and services provided by the government. Those government activities in 
which government has a monopoly, but where this monopoly is agreed upon, do not reduce 
economic freedom. On the contrary, when government has a monopoly in those services that 
can be provided on the market too (health care, schooling), this reduces economic freedom. 
However, in this case, in fact, the government uses its coercive power because it prohibits 
individuals from supplying these services, and so accordingly, this case applies to coercive 
governmental activities which will be examined in the next section. Thus it may be that 
                                                 
11 We note that the services with agreed monopoly do not coincide with public goods, most importantly because 
public goods include coercive activities too. But we think that the crucial problem is that the notion itself is 
dubious because the criterion economists use to qualify a good as a public good is arbitrary, and reflect beliefs 
rather than objective measures: the criterion of excludability is only a matter of cost, and accordingly a matter of 
degree. See Block (1983). 
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people, for various reasons, prefer these services when they are provided by the government 
to when they are provided by private firms. If so, the government will be bigger than 
otherwise, but, this does not hurt economic freedom. In Table 1 we summarize non-coercive 
government activities. 
 
Non-coercive governmental activities 
 
Services with agreed monopoly  
Services that provide a favorable framework for individuals’ 
decisions (monetary system, statistics, etc.) 
Services provided on competitive grounds 
Services that are provided both by the government and by private 
firms on the same terms (e.g., schooling, health care, etc.) 
 
Table 1. Non-coercive governmental activities 
 
A conclusion from the above is that while non-coercive government activities do not hurt 
economic freedom, they have an impact on the size of the government. In principle, one can 
imagine such a country where for instance many competitive services are provided by the 
government because people prefer these to those provided by private firms, causing big 
government, but despite this fact economic freedom is not hurt. That is, as already argued 
above, big government does not necessary reduce economic freedom. The other thing that 
supports this assertion is related to services with agreed monopoly. Clearly, up to a certain 
point the quality of these services depends on financial resources devoted to them: the bigger 
the government the better the quality of these services. 
Note that both cases imply that efficiency also matters. Both services with agreed 
monopolies and competitive services can and must be analyzed according to the criterion of 
efficiency. It may be that there are significant efficiency losses as regards these government 
actions, which is, of course, an argument against the government actions or in favor of small 
government. But bear in mind that this argument is not based on economic freedom grounds, 
but rather, efficiency grounds, which is a different thing. 
 
4.2. Coercive activities 
 
As regards the coercive activities of a state, we proposed above to differentiate between 
freedom-compatible and freedom non-compatible coercive activities. The former, being 
predictable, are compatible with the functioning of the market because they allow individuals 
to make plans and realize them on the market. The point is that these government activities 
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such as taxation or compulsory services or work safety regulations can be accounted for. As 
opposed to these, non predictable activities make individuals’ planning impossible or at least 
largely uncertain. They are non-compatible with a free market. 
Freedom-compatible coercive activities do not hurt economic freedom, provided they 
conform to the ideal of the Rule of Law. This does not mean that one should not evaluate 
freedom-compatible activities according to further criteria.12 First of all, as implicitly 
suggested above, any deviation from the ideal reduces economic freedom. Clearly, this issue 
is related to the quality of the Rule of Law.  Furthermore, in most cases (e.g., compulsory 
military service) efficiency matters also. On the other hand, freedom non-compatible coercive 
activities reduce economic freedom per se; they must be rejected solely on the basis of 
freedom non-compatibility, and the efficiency criterion does not come into play at all. 
A crucial question is thus how to separate those coercive activities that are the pre-
conditions for freedom from those that harm it. On a conceptual level one can apply 
Vanberg’s (2001) constitutional choice argument as a criterion for what is “laid down 
beforehand”. Given that a constitutional choice means an agreement “on rules”, the process of 
this choice defines whether the coercive activities of the government fit the ideal of the Rule 
of Law. The question to be answered in this case is whether a particular coercive activity of 
the government passes the test of voluntariness on a constitutional level. Although the 
practical meaning of voluntariness of the choice of rules is dubious, it is a good conceptual 
tool for deciding whether a certain government regulation harms economic freedom or not. 
Having made these rather general remarks, let us analyze the coercive activities of the 
government in a more detail. As regards freedom-compatible activities the important thing is 
that they include not only those government activities that are by definition laws (rules), but 
those general regulations that are laid down in the form of rules specifying a certain type of 
activity, conforming ideally to the principle of the Rule of Law. These regulations may 
concern for instance the techniques of production by limiting the scope of experimentation, or 
by prohibiting some activities for reasons of health, or by permitting other activities only 
when certain precautions are taken, and so forth. Clearly, these regulations raise the cost of 
production and reduce productivity, but they do so equally for all who engage in the particular 
production activity and can be taken into account when making plans. Note that, of course, 
                                                 
12 It is worth noting that Hayek himself talks about ‘expediency’, a concept which is not clearly defined and 
seems to include such additional criteria as fairness, or justice, or efficiency. Instead of ‘expediency’ we adhere 
to the term ‘efficiency’ for reasons developed in Colombatto (2004). 
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these regulations must be analyzed, in the second place, according to the criterion of 
efficiency. 13 
In addition to the above activities, there are those which should be considered necessary 
implications of government monopoly over coercion. These government activities include 
most importantly the enforcement of contracts, the security of property rights, or national 
security. There is no doubt that for instance ensuring the security of property rights, while 
being a coercive activity, does not harm freedom; on the contrary, it is necessary for the Rule 
of Law. 
As opposed to these freedom-compatible regulations there are those that are not 
compatible with economic freedom. These latter regulations include all kinds of controls such 
as price, quantity and wage control. Clearly, these coercive activities of the government 
represent the kind of infringement of the individual’s private sphere which is an obstacle to 
individuals freely contracting with each others. So do, besides these regulations, all kinds of 
government monopolies for those goods and services which could be otherwise provided on a 
competitive basis. The services or goods upon which the government does not have an agreed 
monopoly should be supplied by the government on the same terms as anybody else, 
otherwise economic freedom is hurt. If government is only one of the (many) providers of 
these goods and services, this does not concern the issue of economic freedom. Clearly, it is 
not enough to examine the extent to which government gets involved in production or 
services; one should also examine whether it has a monopoly.14 
The third type of freedom non-compatible coercive activities is government subsidies to 
particular firms (private or state) and various transfers which arbitrarily differentiate between 
agents. Transfers and subsidies should be seen as coercive actions because those who get 
particular subsidies are forced to behave not according to their plans but according to the 
government’s will.  
To sum up, freedom-compatible coercive activities can be taken into account and refer to 
everybody, whilst freedom non-compatible ones are those that arbitrarily differentiate 
between individuals and/or cannot be accounted for. Table 2 summarizes the coercive 
activities of the government. 
                                                 
13 For instance, there is no doubt that compulsory military service or some work regulations must be rejected on 
an efficiency ground, although these do not hamper individuals in making and following their plans on the 
market.   
14 Note that the empirical literature we reviewed above, by and large, neglects this latter issue. Big government 
here relates only to the question of “how much”, that is, how much the government reduces economic freedom, 
and not to “how”, which refers to the way the governmental actions are taken. 
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Coercive governmental activities 
 
Freedom-compatible activities Freedom non-compatible activities 
General rules and regulations laid down beforehand 
conforming to the Rule of Law (e.g., laws, work 
safety and health regulation, etc.) 
Controls  
· Price 
· Quantity 
· Wage 
Services that are necessary implications of the 
monopoly over coercion (enforcement of contracts 
and property rights, national security, etc.) 
Services or production without agreed monopoly 
which should be provided on competitive grounds, but 
over which government has a monopoly 
 Government subsidies to firms  and transfers 
 
Table 2. Coercive governmental activities 
 
5. Measuring economic freedom 
 
In what follows we will explore how the above framework for an understanding of 
government actions leads us to propose an alternative concept of the measurement of 
economic freedom. We have to note that it is not our intention here to elaborate a precise 
methodology for this measurement, something which is beyond the scope of the present 
paper. Rather, our aim is to develop this measurement concept theoretically.  In order to better 
highlight our proposition let us briefly summarize the most important critiques we level 
against the reviewed empirical literature, and more importantly against the indexes of 
economic freedom themselves. 
From our viewpoint both indexes of economic freedom embody a contradiction between 
the theoretical notion of economic freedom and what is measured. The fact that this 
contradiction does not cause a problem for most researchers means, in principle, that either 
they have a notion of economic freedom which is different from ours; or they do not a have a 
theory about economic freedom; instead, they have various theories about the effects of 
particular economic policies and institutions. If the latter is the case, and we believe this is the 
case as regards the majority of the literature we have reviewed, economic freedom is nothing 
else but a label for a collection of certain kinds of institutional or economic policy variables 
which one individual (the researcher) thinks should be followed. However, all this does not 
mean that we think that these examinations are of no utility at all. We do think, however, that 
most of them are about the effects of certain kinds of economic policies, and not about that of 
economic freedom. The societies defined as economically free by these indexes may or may 
not be free in the sense we conceptualize economic freedom. 
Nevertheless, it is not obvious that mixing economic policy variables with more stable, 
institutional variables makes sense at all. When looking at this problem from the perspective 
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of growth regressions, we can come to the conclusion that there are several problems with 
such a method.15 We also find it problematic to confuse economic policy variables with 
institutiona l variables, but our point is not concerned with empirics, but with the theory of 
freedom just presented. From the theory previously laid down we can conclude that the 
indexes of economic freedom are more specific than we would need in order to measure 
economic freedom, because they try to measure the content of the rules and of economic 
policy and not just whether the government follows general rules when acting as an economic 
player. 
It may be true that following rules will lead to ‘better’ policies than otherwise, but it is one 
question whether the government follows rules and another whether the policies it applies are 
‘good’. In addition, a government that does not abide by rules in general can also follow 
‘good’ policies. Accordingly, one should separate the content of economic policy from the 
way this economic policy is practiced. While economic policy may (and probably should) be 
questioned on the grounds of efficiency (fairness or justice), in many cases it cannot in itself 
be questioned on the grounds of economic freedom. To evaluate according to the criterion of 
economic freedom, one must have information about the way the government realizes 
economic policy: one has to ask whether these policies are subject to general abstract rules 
laid down beforehand.16 By this argument we are not proposing that the content of economic 
policy is not important; on the contrary, it is extremely important, but from the perspective of 
economic efficiency. Clearly, these two things are confused in the literature we reviewed in 
Section 2. 
We do not assert that the indexes of economic freedom are completely futile, for at least 
two reasons: (1) besides economic freedom one still may be interested in measuring any 
specific content of economic policy, and (2), not all components of the index are 
contradictory to the notion of economic freedom we develop in this paper. In spite of this, in 
what follows we will criticize the indexes17 and we will show that by their help one can 
answer the question of which or what kinds of policies are ‘good’ for economic growth, rather 
than whether the count ry is economically free or not. 
                                                 
15 First, it does not provide answers for some of the most important normative and positive questions (Rodrik 
2005). Second, good policies and good institutions move together across countries, which leads some researchers 
to say that economic policies do not have any effect on growth beyond institutions, or the institutions define the 
economic policy that is followed in the long run. 
16 It follows that we have two reasons for arguing against policy-making per se: one is on the ground of 
economic freedom, and the other is on the ground of efficiency. 
17 More precisely, we deal only with the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFW Index), but because of the 
similarity of the two indexes the essence of what will be said applies to the Heritage’s index too.  
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To provide evidence for this assertion, in Table 3 we categorize the variables of the EFW 
Index according to whether they measure freedom in a sense we have developed above. 
 
Components concerning economic 
freedom 
Components not necessarily 
concerning economic 
freedom 
Components concerning economic 
policy 
1. B. Transfers and subsidies as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
2. A. Judicial independence: the 
judiciary is independent and not 
subject to interference by the 
government or parties in disputes 
 
2. B. Impartial courts: a trusted legal 
framework exists for private 
businesses to challenge the legality of 
government actions or regulations 
 
2. C. Protection of intellectual 
property 
 
2. D. Military interference in the rule 
of law and the political process 
 
2. E. Integrity of the legal system 
 
3. D. Freedom to own foreign 
currency bank accounts domestically 
and abroad 
 
4. B. Regulatory trade barriers 
 
4. D. Difference between official 
exchange rate and black-market rate 
 
4. E. International capital market 
controls  
 
5. C. Business regulations 
1. C. Government enterprises 
and investment as a share of 
total investment 
 
4. A. Taxes on international 
trade 
 
4. C. Actual size of trade 
sector compared to expected 
size 
 
5. A. Credit market regulations 
 
5. B. Labor market regulations 
 
 
1. A. General government 
consumption spending as a 
percentage of total consumption 
 
1. D. Top marginal tax rate (and 
income threshold at which it applies) 
 
3. A. Average annual growth of the 
money supply in the last five years 
minus average annual growth of real 
GDP in the last ten years 
 
3. B. Standard inflation variability 
during the last five years 
 
3. C. Recent inflation rate 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Components of the Economic Freedom of the World Index according to their relevance to economic 
freedom 
 
In the spirit of what have been said before, we can categorize the components of EFW Index 
into three groups. The first one consists of those that embody coercive government actions, 
and consequently, do concern economic freedom. Amongst them we can find components that 
refer to freedom-compatible coercive actions. These are the listed components of Area 2, 
which measure the quality of the Rule of Law. The remaining components belong to freedom 
non-compatible coercive activities, and accordingly reduce economic freedom. Above we 
referred to these as controls (3.D., 4.B., 4.D, 4.E., 5.C.) or transfers and subsidies (1.B.). 
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In the second column there are those components of the index that capture only the result 
of certain governmental or regulatory activities without referring to the way they are 
executed. Consequently, they cannot be measures of economic freedom without further 
qualification. 
Certain measures of the size of government fall into this category, such as transfers or the 
scope of public property. As far as government enterprises are concerned (1.C.), the question 
of public versus private ownership is, of course, of great importance for efficiency, but to 
know whether it has something to do with economic freedom, we would have to have more 
information about the way public ownership is formed. As we explained above, we would 
have to know whether these state owned enterprises are monopolies. 
The other four components in this column are those which have at least one such 
subcomponent that can not be said to measure the reduction in economic freedom. For 
instance credit market regulations (5.A.) cannot be clearly categorized in the first (freedom 
concerning) column because some of its subcomponents (ownership of banks, extension of 
credit) refer to the size of the private sector in banking, which is important, but does not 
necessarily tell us anything about economic freedom, while other subcomponents which 
evaluate credit and interest rate controls, of course, refer to a reduction of freedom. To 
conclude, these measures (4.A., 4.C., 5.A., 5.B.) do not necessarily reduce economic freedom 
because, as Vanberg (2001:21-36) argues, they may represent constitutional choices, which 
means to us that they do not hurt the criteria of the certainty, generality, or equality of the law; 
consequently they do not reduce freedom. 
In the third column we listed those components of the index which do not measure 
economic freedom; rather, they measure the content of policy and whether the government 
follows ‘good’ policies. The level of government spending (1.A.), and of taxes (1.D.) are such 
kinds of measures. As we have seen, government spending in itself does not have much to do 
with economic freedom, because it does not exclusively concern coercive activities, although 
it has a lot to do with efficiency. 
As regards taxes, what one should avoid is to count  some components twice when 
measuring economic freedom. As far as the freedom-compatible coercive and non-coercive 
activities are concerned, since these actions themselves do not reduce economic freedom, at 
least when they correspond to the ideal, it would be erroneous to regard the taxes financing 
these actions as hurting economic freedom. As far as the freedom non-compatible government 
actions are concerned, these reduce economic freedom per se, consequently taking into 
account taxes too would be duplicating. Put differently, asking how much tax revenue the 
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government needs in order to finance the freedom-compatible coercive and non-coercive 
activities is a matter of efficiency, not of economic freedom. It follows from the above that 
the EFW Index cannot avoid the problem of duplication by taking into account both taxes and 
those components (e.g., various controls) that reduce economic freedom. 
The last three components in this column focus on monetary policy (3.A., 3.B., 3.C.). 
There is no question that bad monetary policy and inflation can cause great social efficiency 
losses, but, aga in, reducing efficiency is not reducing freedom. These measures do not say 
anything about whether monetary policy is conducted on the basis  of certain rules. Even the 
growth of the money supply does not tell us whether the fact that the money supply did not 
grow very fast was the result of a rule or just an accidental event in an arbitrary monetary 
policy. 
In sum, the mere fact that a particular country follows a different economic policy 
compared to another country does not imply that the two countries differ in terms of 
economic freedom, even if the  economic policy of one country may be ‘better’ (more 
efficient ). 
As shown above there are several problems with the EFW Index: policy variables are 
mixed with institutional variables, numerous components do not necessarily refer to economic 
freedom, there is a duplication, etc. We argue that these shortcomings stem from a lack of a 
theory of economic freedom. In what follows we propose an alternative concept to measure 
economic freedom, built upon our categorization of government actions, which tries to 
measure economic freedom in terms of the character of government activities. Here the extent 
of economic freedom can be reduced from two sides: (1) by the deviation from an ideal of the 
Rule of Law (freedom-compatible government activities), and (2) by freedom non-compatible 
government activities. 
As regards the first point we have to examine the method and nature of forming and 
reforming constitutional rules, and of course, “how these processes may themselves be 
subjected to rules” (Vanberg 2001:35). Thus if we want to measure economic freedom, we 
can hardly avoid constructing a measure of the extent to which the choice between different 
rules are subject to rules on a higher level.18 That is, what we need to measure is not only 
whether the Rule of Law matches the Hayekian ideal, but also whether and to what extent 
rules, once they exist, are followed in practice. This latter is important because the Rule of 
                                                 
18 We believe that Vanberg’s constitutional choice is just another term for the Hayekian implicit “social 
contract” concept. Note that a crucial question in this respect is what qualifies a public constitutional contract as 
voluntary (see also Colombatto 2004). 
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Law should not necessarily be codified; thus formal rules are not enough for us to decide 
whether an economy can be said to be governed according to the Rule of Law. We also need 
de facto practice, and in addition, we need de facto practice even if, as an extreme case, a 
country does not have any written rules. Here the problem we face is that written rules do not 
necessarily become effective constraints: there may be other factors that make the government 
behave in accordance with the Rule of Law. 
Clearly, here we have to analyze the following two aspects of the way governmental 
actions are taken. The first one concerns whether the government relies on rules when making 
decisions (rule-following problem), since coercion is admissible only when it conforms to 
general rules and not when it is a means of achieving a particular aim of current policy. The 
second one relates to the extent to which the government is committed to follow the rules that 
it itself laid down beforehand (commitment problem). Thus one can imagine such a situation 
in which de iure the government is bound to rules, i.e., in principle it relies on rules, but in 
practice it does not keep to these rules in every respect.19 
Besides the deviation from the ideal of the Rule of Law, freedom non-compatible 
government activities hurt economic freedom, too. Based on the analysis of the  government 
activities we have developed above, we argue that economic freedom can be reduced in three 
respects. First, all price, quantity and wage controls reduce economic freedom. Second, 
government services and production with a not agreed monopoly also reduce it. And finally 
when government subsidizes particular firms or gives transfers this is also against economic 
freedom. 
To sum up, non-coercive government activities by definition do not reduce economic 
freedom, although they may increase the size of the government. So, when measuring 
economic freedom we should focus our attention only on coercive activities. As argued 
above, there are two channels through which economic freedom can be hurt: freedom non-
compatible activities and as regards freedom-compatible coercive activities, any deviation 
from the ideal of the Rule of Law. 
                                                 
19 A possible fruitful way of developing indexes of economic freedom understood as governance by the Rule of 
Law is using de iure and de facto indexes of judicial independence developed by Feld and Voigt (2003), and 
Hayo and Voigt (2004). We think that the de facto index may be a good proxy for the rule-following problem, 
whereas the difference of the two indexes may be appropriate for the commitment problem. 
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6. Conclusions  
 
In this paper we have developed a concept of economic freedom based on Hayek (1960), and 
as a step further we have proposed a categorization of government actions, which allowed us 
to conceptualize the measurement of economic freedom in a different way from the indexes of 
economic freedom. A clear-cut concept of economic freedom is important not only for 
ranking countries according to a scale, but more importantly, for developing new substantial 
results as regards how economic freedom affects growth. In other words, we think that 
empirical investigations may be important, but we argue that these should be based on a 
coherent theory; that is, our position is ‘theory first, and empiricism after’. 
In our view the major problem with the literature on economic freedom lies in a confusion 
between the criterion of economic freedom and other criteria, such as efficiency, justice or 
fairness, or whatever. In this spirit, arguing clearly against government intervention is not 
equivalent to arguing in favor of freedom. Thus an examination of government actions must 
be based upon a hierarchy of criteria, and in this hierarchy freedom-compatibility comes in 
the very first place. The criteria of efficiency should be used only in the second place; 
accordingly, an efficiency loss does not necessary hurt economic freedom. That is, big 
government is contradictory to freedom only when governmental actions that make it “big” 
do not derive from general rules laid down beforehand. To put it differently, the size of the 
government is one thing, and the issue of economic freedom is another. We have put forward 
the idea that a government action is compatible with the free market system only if it is based 
on known general abstract rules, which makes us see the Rule of Law as a criterion for 
economic freedom, and not efficiency or other criteria. 
However, further work is needed to develop the details of the measurement of economic 
freedom in a way we propose, and we do not think this is an easy task. 
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